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 The current aging of the U.S. population carries substantial social and economic costs, as 
many elderly individuals must seek out assistance with long-term medical and custodial care. 
This paper studies whether increases in the number of low-skilled immigrants, who are 
disproportionately concentrated in the health care and home production fields, have impacted the 
housing decisions and health of elderly individuals. Using an instrumental variable strategy to 
exploit state-by-time variation in the concentration of immigrants in the U.S., I find that low-
skilled immigration increases the share of low-skilled labor in the labor force, which in turn 
decreases the probability of elderly persons living in institutions. Given that elderly individuals 
have indicated preferences for aging within their own homes as opposed to moving into skilled 
nursing facilities, these results imply that the composition of local labor markets can encourage 
the actualization of elderly choice. My results on elderly mortality, however, are less conclusive. 
The findings suggest a positive impact of increased low-skilled labor force shares on the average 
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Due to recent advances in medicine as well as the aging of the baby boomer generation, 
the number and percentage of elderly individuals living in the US have been rapidly increasing in 
recent years.  As many elderly individuals must seek out assistance with long-term medical and 
custodial care due to higher average rates of difficulties and disabilities, this aging population 
carries substantial social and economic costs. Older individuals who require long-term care must 
either hire in-home care providers – which allows them to continue living in their own homes – 
or enter a skilled nursing facility.1 Those individuals who enter skilled nursing homes become a 
part of the institutionalized U.S. population, while those hiring long-term care providers in their 
own homes remain non-institutionalized.  Qualitative studies indicate that the majority of elderly 
people in the U.S. would prefer to stay in their own homes as they age and develop difficulties 
with independent living (Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey on Nursing Homes, 2001).  
However, individuals are often constrained in making this care decision by the extent of their 
medical difficulties, the availability of home care providers within their communities, and their 
financial resources, both private and public, for long-term care. Thus, any change in the long-
term care labor market is likely to have a significant impact on the care choices of elderly 
individuals.  
Similar to the rising percentage of elderly individuals, the percentage of immigrants in 
the U.S. has also been increasing. Immigration may influence the long-term care decisions of 
elderly individuals in need of assistance, as immigrants are disproportionately concentrated in 
health care and home service occupations. Previous studies have established that immigration 
influxes lead to changes in the compositions of local labor markets, specifically by increasing the 
percentage of low-skilled workers in the labor force.2  As many of the long-term care 
occupations rely heavily on low-skilled workers, this increase in low-skilled labor driven by low-																																																								
1 Note that this is a simplification of available long-term care options. Individuals seeking long-
term care may also attend adult day care centers, move into independent/senior living facilities, 
and/or hire hospice services. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, of the 
8,357,100 people receiving long-term care in 2012, 56.7% hired home health agencies, 16.6% 
lived in nursing homes, 14.9% were enrolled in hospice, 8.5% lived in the residential care 
communities, and 3.3% attended adult day care services (Harris-Kojetin et al., 2013). Due to the 
coding of institutionalization in the Census data, my analysis must categorize individuals 
utilizing all non-nursing home long-term care options as non-institutionalized. The vast majority 
of these individuals, however, remain in independent living arrangements.   
2 Cortés and Tessada (2011) and Lewis (2011).   
	 6 
skilled immigration could further increase the labor supply of workers in health care and home 
service occupations.  
This paper analyzes the impact of an influx of low-skilled immigrants into the U.S. on the 
long-term care decisions of elderly individuals residing in the U.S. by focusing specifically on 
elderly living arrangements and mortality. I hypothesize that an influx of low-skilled immigrants 
into a state is likely to disproportionately increase the labor supply of low-skilled health and 
home services workers in that geographic area. This low-skilled labor supply increase could then 
impact the long-term care choices of elderly individuals through two possible mechanisms: 
decreased costs of long-term care and/or local economy shifts towards more labor-intensive care.  
The first mechanism for an impact on long-term care choices suggests that an increase in 
the labor supply would lead to a decrease in the cost and an increase in the availability of hiring 
home service and health care workers. This theory is supported by Cortés and Tessada (2011), 
who find that low-skilled immigration increases the average hours of work for high-skilled U.S. 
women while also decreasing their hours of household production and increasing their 
expenditures on housekeeping services. These results indicate that high-skilled women substitute 
away from home production when the prices of services that are substitutes for home production 
are lowered. Cortés (2008) reports that a 10 percent increase in the share of low-skilled 
immigrants in a city’s labor force reduces the prices of services that are immigrant-intensive by 
approximately 2 percent. Cortés’ analysis of mechanisms behind this price change suggests that 
the price reduction of immigrant-intensive services is driven primarily by reduced wages for 
low-skilled immigrants (accompanied by little change in the wages of low-skilled natives). If the 
costs of hiring home service and health care workers both in home and in institutions decrease by 
approximately the same amount due to low-skilled immigration, then any resulting change in the 
living arrangements of elderly individuals will depend on those individuals’ preferences. Given 
their stated preferences for own-home living, this price mechanism suggests that we would 
expect to see a decrease in the probability of an elderly individual living in an institution 
following an increase in the low-skilled labor force share driven by low-skilled immigration. 
The second mechanism through which immigration may impact long-term care choices is 
through capital-skill complementarity, which is discussed in depth by Lewis (2011 and 2013). 
Lewis finds that increases in low-skilled relative supply, driven by increases in low-skilled 
immigrants, are associated with slower growth in capital-labor and capital-output ratios. This 
	 7 
result suggests that manufacturing automation complements middle-skilled workers relative to 
low-skilled workers. Thus, an increase in low-skilled immigration could induce the local markets 
to shift towards more labor intensive and less capital intensive care.  Since care in nursing homes 
is less labor intensive than private home care, capital-skill complementarity suggests that an 
increase in the labor supply of low-skilled workers relative to any capital changes would 
encourage a shift toward private home living. Regardless of the mechanism, both price changes 
and endogenous technology adoption shifts predict that an increase in low-skilled workers in a 
local area will reduce the level of institutionalization if elderly individuals prefer to live in their 
own homes as they age. My analysis tests this prediction without investigating the specific 
mechanisms driving the results.  
My empirical strategy exploits the state-by-year variation of low-skilled immigrants in 
the U.S. One challenge with using this source of variation, however, is the potential endogeneity 
of immigrant flows. Factors that motivate new immigrants to settle within a state in a given year, 
such as labor market opportunities, are likely also correlated with the outcome variables in which 
I am interested. For example, if – hypothetically – many low-skilled immigrants move to Texas 
in order to take advantage of recent increases in available jobs in the home health care industry, 
then a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis of the impact of low-skilled 
immigrant flows on institutionalization will yield biased estimates. To address the potential 
endogeneity of immigration to specific locations in the U.S., I instrument for low-skilled 
immigrant concentrations using the 1970 distribution of immigrants from each foreign country 
across different regions of the U.S. This instrument allocates new waves of immigrants from 
each foreign country across different states in the U.S. using their historical distribution, thus 
estimating increases in the immigration flow that are dependent on past migration settlement 
patterns and are exogenous to current economic conditions that might have their own 
independent effect on the health and living arrangements of the elderly. 
Consistent with my theoretical hypothesis, I find strong evidence that low-skilled 
immigration impacts the long-term care decisions of elderly individuals. Using data from the 
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 Census as well as the 2006-2014 American Community Survey (ACS), 
my two-stage least squared (2SLS) regression estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the 
predicted low-skilled labor force share driven by low-skilled immigrant flows decreases a U.S. 
native elderly individual’s probability of living in an institution by 0.002 percentage points, or 5 
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percent. This effect is heterogeneous, with much larger effects for females, non-married 
individuals, those living in metropolitan areas, and those who report any type of difficulty or 
disability. In contrast to this statistically significant result, my analysis of elderly mortality yields 
less definitive estimates. The results indicate that increases in the predicted low-skilled labor 
force share cause an increase in average age at death. However, they also suggest that changes in 
the labor force cause a small, but imprecise, increase in aggregate mortality rates.  
 These findings have important implications. Given prior research noting elderly 
individuals’ preferences for remaining in their own homes, my institutionalization analysis 
indicates that increases in the low-skilled labor force share allow the actualization of elderly 
choice. As the U.S. elderly population continues to rapidly grow, my results illustrate that the 
long-term care markets can adjust to meet increasing demand for in-home health care if the 
composition of the labor market also adapts. Understanding the role of low-skilled immigrant 
labor in this actualization process can help us make better policy decisions as we confront the 
aging population and reconsider immigration reform.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature and 
motivates this research. Section III describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section IV 
presents the empirical strategy. Section V discusses the main results, and Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Literature Review and Motivation 
A. An Aging Population  
 Due to recent advances in medicine as well as the aging of the baby boomer generation, 
the percentage of elderly individuals living in the U.S. has rapidly increased in recent years. 
Figure 1 uses data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census, as well as the 2001-2014 
American Community Surveys (ACS) – which are all publicly available via the Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series – to illustrate the percentage of individuals aged 50 and up out of the total 
population in the U.S. from 1970 to 2014. Figure 2 displays nonparametric probability density 
plots of the distribution of ages in the U.S. over subsequent years. Both figures illustrate a 
gradual shift in the age distribution towards the right over time, and thus an aging of the 
population. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration on 
Aging (2016), there are currently 46.2 million people aged 65 or older living in the U.S. 
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(comprising 14.5 percent of the total population). This age group is expected to grow to 98 
million (or 21.7 percent of the population) by 2040. 
Population aging carries substantial social and economic costs, as the aging process 
causes individuals to develop physical and/or mental disabilities. Older individuals often develop 
difficulties with common tasks for independent living – known as instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADLs) – such as completing household chores, shopping, monitoring medications, and 
handling finances. Eventually, these difficulties can progress to problems with more basic tasks 
of everyday life – labeled activities of daily living (ADLs) – such as eating, bathing, dressing, 
and using the bathroom. Although people of all ages are susceptible to difficulties with both 
types of tasks, the rate of prevalence is particularly high for older individuals and increases 
exponentially with age. In 2014, the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) noted in their 
annual summary of U.S. health statistics that 0.8% of individuals aged 18-44 reported difficulties 
with ADLs, compared to 1.9% of 45-64 year olds, 3.5% of 65-74 year olds, and 10.6% of those 
75 and older. The percentage reporting difficulties with IADLs is even higher, at 1.5%, 3.8%, 
6.4%, and 18.8% for the 18-44, 45-64, 65-74, and 75 and older age groups respectively. Given 
that the NHIS includes only the noninstitutionalized population, these estimates likely represent 
a lower bound for the older age groups since more disabled individuals likely move into skilled 
nursing facilities as their difficulties increase. Figure 3 uses ACS data to represent visually the 
percentage of individuals who report any type of difficulty (including cognitive, ambulatory, 
independent living, self-care, vision, and/or hearing difficulties) by age. Consistent with the 
NHIS findings, the rate of reported difficulties in Figure 3 increases exponentially with age. 
Note, however, that these rates are much higher in the ACS than in the NHIS, most likely due to 
the ACS’s broader measurement of “difficulty.”  
Research in the economics and health fields finds that there have been recent decreases in 
activity limitations for the U.S. elderly as well as increases in the same rates for the middle-aged. 
Freedman et al. (2004) analyze trends across five national surveys and note declines in the rates 
of difficulties with daily activities for individuals aged 70 and older beginning in the mid-1990s. 
When Freedman et al. (2012) extend this analysis to include more contemporary data, they find 
continued decreases in difficulties with IADLs and ADLs for the 85 and up population but 
stagnant levels for those aged 65-84 and even slight increases for 55-64 year olds at the rate of 
approximately 0.1 percentage points per year. This result is supported by Martin and Schoeni 
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(2014), who use data from the NHIS to show decreases in limitations – concentrated in the early 
2000s – for those aged 65 and older as well as increases for those between the ages of 40 and 64. 
The pattern of rising health problems for the prime aged labor force population has also been 
documented in literature focusing on the recent increase in Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) claims. Increases in SSDI claims are driven primarily by increases in musculoskeletal 
conditions and mental illness, which are due to changes in both the rules for disability insurance 
and population demographics (including increased rates of obesity) over time (Butcher and Park, 
2008). 
Regardless of the causes, increases in disabilities and difficulties for the middle-aged 
population as well as persistently high, though decreasing, rates for the elderly carry high social 
and economic costs. In 2005, long-term care expenditures accounted for 1% of average GDP 
across all OECD countries. That share is predicted to reach 2-4% by 2040 (Fujisawa and 
Colombo, 2009). This pattern indicates an increasing importance of long-term care in OECD 
countries, driven primarily by aging populations. To maintain their quality of life as they age, 
many elderly individuals who develop difficulties must seek out long-term care. The options for 
this type of care are typically limited to hiring home care providers, attending adult day care 
centers, moving to independent/senior living facilities, or entering skilled nursing homes. 
According to the American Elder Care Research Organization (2015), the average cost of skilled 
nursing homes in the U.S. in 2015 was $80,300 per year. In comparison, assisted living facilities 
averaged $43,200. The availability of assisted living facilities, however, varies dramatically 
across the country (Stevenson and Grabowski, 2010). The final option for elderly individuals is 
to remain within their own homes and hire paid and/or unpaid home care providers for 
assistance. This option is the least expensive for the individual, with home care aides averaging 
$20 per hour in the U.S. and thus approximately $40,000 a year (at 8 hours a day for 5 days a 
week). However, the availability of home health care providers also varies by location, mostly 
due to the presence (or lack thereof) of certificate-of-need (CON) laws (Rahman et al., 2016).  
CON laws limit the growth of long-term providers, and as a result, Medicare and Medicaid 
spending grew much faster for nursing home care and slower for home health care in states with 
these laws than in states without. Thus, elderly people who live in states without CON laws may 
have more options for hiring in-home assistance than their peers who live in states with CON 
	 11 
laws due to a supply constraint causing a shift in the supply curve for in-home health care 
options as a result of CON regulation.  
Given the long-term care options available within their communities, many factors 
influence the long-term care decisions of elderly individuals. Multiple studies have found that the 
majority of people in the U.S. would prefer to stay in their own homes as they age or, at the very 
least, move into an assisted living facility instead of a skilled nursing home if independent living 
was no longer an option (for an example, see the 2001 Kaiser Family Foundation National 
Survey on Nursing Homes). However, the elderly are often constrained in making this living 
decision by their financial resources for long-term care.  
Two important sources of financial assistance for elderly individuals are the Medicare 
and Medicaid health insurance programs. Both programs, however, have strict limitations on 
long-term care services. Medicare, the federally funded health care insurance program for those 
65 years of age and older, only covers care in skilled nursing facilities for those who have 
recently been admitted to a hospital and require daily, inpatient-level, skilled nursing care. Once 
those requirements are met, Medicare also caps benefits after 100 days in the facility. In addition, 
Medicare does not cover home health services unless a doctor certifies that the individual is 
homebound and needs part-time/intermittent skilled nursing care (Grabowski, 2007). This care 
can only be delivered by a registered nurse (RN) or a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and thus 
does not include standalone home health aide services. In contrast, Medicaid – the state and 
federal jointly funded health insurance program for low-income individuals – varies widely by 
state. All states cover long-term skilled nursing home care in Medicaid certified facilities. By 
law, Medicaid cannot provide financial assistance for home based care; however, through 
waiving federal statutory requirements under section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, which 
was enacted in 1981 as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act, all state Medicaid programs now 
offer Home and Community Based Services (HBCS) waivers that allow the provision of long-
term care services in home and community based settings (Grabowski, 2010). Each waiver is 
unique in which types of medical and non-medical costs it covers, but most HBCS waivers 
require individuals to need a nursing home level of care to receive financial assistance for care 
in-home. Some waivers also allow patients to choose their own care providers, an option known 
as Consumer Directed (CD) care, which also grants individuals the ability to hire family 
	 12 
members who may already be providing them with unpaid assistance. Thus, in most states, 
Medicaid covers a more custodial set of home health care services than Medicare.  
Past research has investigated how changes in Medicare and Medicaid policy impact the 
home ownership and health care decisions of elderly individuals, with researchers finding that 
Medicaid estate recovery programs have a significant impact on the rates of homeownership 
(Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2012) and that Medicare reimbursement caps for home-based care also 
significantly impact private out-of-pocket medical expenditures and rates of independent living 
for the elderly (McKnight, 2006; Engelhardt and Greenhalgh-Stanley, 2010; Golberstein et al., 
2009; Orsini, 2010). Specifically, less generous home care reimbursement policies cause a 
greater percentage of the elderly to give up independent living and a higher number of those in 
lower income populations to rely more heavily on informal (unpaid) care, which often places a 
caregiving burden on low-income families. This branch of research emphasizes that individuals 
can, and often do, substitute informal care for publicly funded home care when given the option. 
People also respond to the financial costs of home health care when determining their living 
arrangements and health care plans. 
In addition to responding to health insurance coverage of home health care services, the 
economics and health literature indicates that an individual’s own income plays a significant role 
in his/her utilization of long-term care services. Goda et al. (2011) analyze the impact of a 
change in social security payments and conclude that a $1,000 increase in annual social security 
income for those with lower education levels decreased the likelihood of residing in a nursing 
home by 24-34% and increased the likelihood of receiving paid home care by 15-16%. They 
explain this result by describing independence as a valued good that motivates the elderly to 
choose less restrictive settings for health care services when they are given the option through 
higher incomes.  
Figure 4 reports the percentage of individuals living in an institution across ages and 
years, from 1970 to 2014, using Census and ACS data. The percent institutionalized is 
approximately zero between the ages of 50 and 65 for all years. After 65, however, the 
percentage of institutionalized individuals begins to rapidly increase with age. This increase is 
less rapid in each subsequent year, indicating that the rate of elderly institutionalization has been 
falling for all age groups since 1970. Figure 5 corroborates this result by illustrating the 
percentage of 50+ year olds living in institutions across time (Panel A). This percentage remains 
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relatively stable at around 2.5-3% from 1970 to 1990 but then begins to fall to a rate of 
approximately 1.75% in 2014. Figure 5 also illustrates the percentage of 50+ year olds who 
report a work disability that live in institutions across time (Panel B). The percentage 
institutionalized is, as predicted, much higher for this population, and we see a similar recent 
reduction in institutionalization. 
Regardless of their living arrangement and care decisions, elderly individuals in the U.S. 
receive a wide range of quality and quantity of long-term care. Many researchers have reported 
high rates of unmet need among those living at home, with Johnson and Wiener (2006) reporting 
that only 51.3% of frail older people living alone received regular care in 2002 and LaPlante et 
al. (2004) highlighting that 21.4% of adults with a difficulty with any ADLs or IADLs had unmet 
caregiving needs in the late 1990s. Those with unmet need also report higher rates of adverse 
health consequences, such as discomfort, distress, mobility restrictions, and concerns over 
hunger and dehydration. Similar to their peers living at home, individuals residing in nursing 
homes also experience various levels of quantity and quality of care. In addition, there is a lack 
of comprehensive federal regulation of skilled nursing facilities. Currently, federal law states that 
skilled nursing facilities accepting Medicare/Medicaid must have at least one registered nurse 
(RN) on duty for eight consecutive hours, seven days a week, as well as “adequate staffing levels 
to meet the needs of the residents to attain or maintain the highest practicable levels of physical, 
mental, and psychosocial well-being” (Harrington et al., 2012). States can set higher standards 
than the federal baseline, and 20 of them have already done so for the minimum requirement for 
RNs. In addition, 34 states have adopted minimum standards for direct care staff. Harrington et 
al. (2012) review the current staffing levels in nursing homes across the U.S. in 2010 and find 
that these facilities had average rates of staff contact hours per resident day just below expert 
recommended levels. The levels also varied greatly across nursing homes. Unfortunately, the 
phenomenon of U.S. nursing homes with staffing levels below recommended standards is not 
unique to 2010, as a report published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 2001 
states that 91% of U.S. nursing homes in 2000 had nurse aide staffing levels “below that 
identified as minimally necessary to provide all the needs care processes that could benefit their 
specific resident population” (Feuerberg, 2001).  
 Staffing levels in nursing homes are important to monitor because they influence patient 
outcomes. Increases in state-specified minimum nursing home staffing levels as well as higher 
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rates of staff retention can lead to reductions in severe deficiency citations as well as 
improvements in certain health conditions for nursing home residents (Chen and Grabowski, 
2015; Barry et al., 2005). In addition, building off of the work of Miller et al. (2009), who report 
that the procyclical nature of state-level mortality rates is driven by the elderly population, 
Stevens et al. (2015) find that elderly women in nursing homes live longer during economic 
recessions due to the countercyclical nature of staffing levels in nursing homes. This 
countercyclicality leads to an increase in the labor supply of nurses and nursing assistants in 
skilled nursing homes during economic recessions. Thus, higher and more consistent staffing 
levels appear to be correlated with, and potentially causally related to, elderly patients’ health 
outcomes. 
In summary, this literature has shown that elderly individuals are constrained in their 
living arrangement and long-term care choices by local health care markets as well as the 
availability of public and private finances. These individuals respond to changes in financial 
costs and income, and they consistently prefer in-home care to institutionalization when given 
the option. However, many individuals are left with unmet care needs, and those who receive 
care are not guaranteed adequate levels. This care deficiency in both in-home and institutional 
settings is important because the quantity and quality of long-term care has a direct impact on 
individuals’ health and wellbeing.  
 
B. The Long-Term Care Field 
 The long-term care field consists of many occupations, with the majority of the work 
primarily completed by registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and certified 
nursing assistants (CNAs) as well as more general home and health care aides. RNs and LPNs 
must complete a specific level of post-secondary education (two years and one year respectively) 
to work in the health care field in the U.S., while the other occupations listed above differ widely 
in educational requirements depending on employer. Typically, CNAs must complete a training 
or competency evaluation program within four months of employment, but they have no strict 
education requirements. For home aides, however, the required training/education is determined 
entirely by their employers (which are either care agencies or the patients themselves). In a 
skilled nursing home environment, RNs typically assess the needs of patients and work with 
LPNs to plan and implement care and then evaluate outcomes. CNAs in nursing homes work 
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under LPNs to assist patients with daily activities, such as eating, bathing, and dressing. Outside 
of nursing homes, home and health care aides have similar roles in patient care as CNAs do in 
institutions, but the home and health care aides work directly in a patient’s home. Note that given 
the flexible nature of these occupation titles as well as the ability of individuals to move between 
institutional and private home settings and thus change job titles, I refer to all CNAs and 
home/health care aides as “direct care workers” for the remainder of this review unless otherwise 
specified. Figures 6 and 7 present the percentage of all health care workers and nurse aides (a 
subset of direct care workers), respectively, working in different industries over time. Both 
graphs show recent increases in “residential care,” “other health,” and “private home” industries 
as well as declines in hospitals and nursing homes. These results perhaps indicate a shift towards 
home-based care, particularly among nursing aides. 
 The long-term care field is a large sector in the U.S. economy and, according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), it is projected to grow rapidly over the coming years. The BLS 
predicts that the home health aide occupation will increase by 38.1%, or by 348,400 jobs, 
between 2014 and 2024, making the position the fifth fastest growing occupation and the 
occupation with the third highest job growth in the U.S. Personal care aides are also projected to 
grow rapidly over this time period – by 25.9% or 458,100 jobs (making the position the highest 
predicted job growth occupation) – as well as RNs – by 16% or 439,100 jobs (the second highest 
job growth occupation). While the long-term care field is growing, the labor patterns of workers 
in direct care positions do not promise a continuous labor supply. Baughman and Smith (2012) 
report “the direct care labor market is characterized by a combination of relatively low wages, 
high turnover rates and a shortage of qualified workers.” The mean duration of employment 
spells for the same direct care worker is only 9.7 months, with less than a third of workers 
leaving a job for another in the direct care field. A much higher percentage of employment spells 
(5.4%) also end in work-limiting disability than in similar occupations. The potential for 
advancing professionally within the health care field for direct care workers also appears to be 
small, as these workers are equally likely to transition to working as RNs as they are to working 
in household service positions. In addition, Smith (2007) notes that direct care workers, 
particularly those in home settings, are vulnerable to being denied legal protection since they are 
not typically considered to be covered by the wage and hour as well as the health and safety 
regulations in the Fair Labor Standards and the Occupational Safety and Health Acts. As a result, 
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the position of direct care worker is often less desirable to potential workers than other positions 
in the long-term care and health care fields. Given these conditions and the increase in demand 
for direct care workers, the current labor shortage for direct care workers in the U.S. economy 
will likely grow over time unless supply dramatically increases in coming years (Stone and 
Wiener, 2001). 
 Hewko et al. (2015) conduct a review of past research to identify the characteristics of 
individuals who work in direct care positions. They find that the average direct care worker is 
female and 36-45 years old with a high school education or less. They report a high level of 
turnover and shortages within the field, as well as a higher risk of injury to direct care workers 
than that for RNs and LPNs. Finally, the authors note a hierarchy within the direct care 
community, as direct care workers who are employed in patients’ homes are more likely to be 
older, identify as immigrants, have lower job stability, earn less, work fewer hours, and have 
fewer fringe benefits than their counterparts who work in institutions.  
In addition to hiring direct care workers, many individuals in need of long-term support 
turn to unpaid family members and friends to assist with their care needs. In the 1990s, 41% of 
primary caregivers for the chronically disabled identified as the patient’s children, while 39% 
identified as spouses (Wolff and Kasper, 2006). Pezzin et al. (2007 and 2009) develop models of 
bargaining power in family caregiving to conclude that child and spousal interactions play a 
large role in determining the living arrangements and family caregiving outcomes for elderly 
individuals in need of assistance. Yet, despite the benefits of receiving informal long-term care 
from a trusted family member or friend, informal caregiving can also have adverse effects on the 
health of the caregiver (Do et al., 2015). 
Overall, direct care workers provide the most hands-on care in the long-term care field. 
They have an essential role in sustaining patient health and quality of life, and as demand for 
long-term care increases so will demand for direct care workers. Unfortunately, the U.S. already 
faces a shortage of these workers due to unattractive and unsupportive working conditions. As a 
result, many elderly must rely on the help of informal caregivers. Unfortunately, this informal 
care is not an option for everyone and may not be sustainable due to the health risks that informal 
caregivers take on while caring for a person with a disability.  
 
C. The Role of Immigrants in Labor Markets and Long-Term Care 
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 The percentage of foreign-born people in the U.S. has also been rising in recent years. 
Figure 8 illustrates this increase graphically using Census and ACS data. In addition, immigrants 
compose a relatively large fraction of health care providers. Figure 9 shows the percentage of 
each listed occupation that identifies as foreign-born over time, with a line for the percentage of 
the total labor force that is foreign-born for reference. In particular, immigrants in the U.S. 
compose a large share of all RNs, LPNs, and direct care workers, and they are more likely to 
work in long-term care than native CNAs (Khatutsky et al., 2010; Schumacher, 2011; Chen, 
2013; Lowell, 2013; Figure 9). Newly arrived foreign-born nurses earn 10% less than their native 
counterparts, but this differential becomes insignificant after approximately 6 years of work 
experience in the U.S. (Schumacher, 2011). This finding suggests either a learning curve for 
immigrant health care workers as they get used to a new country’s system of health care, 
employer discrimination, and/or cohort differences in the immigrant nursing labor supply. 
Interestingly, immigrant CNAs are older, have higher levels of education, and earn slightly 
higher wages than their native counterparts (Khatutsky et al., 2010). In spite of their prevalence 
in the field, however, immigrant health care workers also report higher levels of discrimination 
and language-related communication barriers at work.  
 Despite the high concentration of foreign-born in the direct care field and the higher 
demand for low-skilled direct care labor due to recent labor shortages in long-term health care, 
there are few pathways for direct care foreign workers to legally immigrate into the U.S. 
Temporary visa programs mostly exclude direct care workers given that these workers do not 
typically have high levels of education and as such are not classified as professionals. The paths 
to legal permanent residency are also predominately closed to direct care workers, since – as one 
of the four admission pathways – permanent employment visas only constitute approximately 15 
percent of total visas each year (Hess and Henrici, 2013). Of these visas, the EB-3 employment 
visa could potentially be used to admit direct care workers through its “other” category. 
However, this category is capped annually at 5,000 visas, and a long backlog of applications 
discourages U.S. employers from sponsoring workers through this program. Thus, many direct 
care immigrant workers enter the U.S. under family-sponsored visas or through illegal channels. 
The lack of employment visas makes immigrant direct care workers, particularly those residing 
in the U.S. illegally, more vulnerable to employer abuse (Henrici 2013; Lin 2016). In contrast, 
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more immigration options are available for higher-skilled workers in the long-term care field – 
such as RNs – allowing more immigrants to enter the U.S. in these occupations (Rasalm, 2009). 
 In addition to their prevalence in the health care field, foreign-born individuals also 
dominate the home services occupations. Figure 10 graphs the percentage of home service 
workers who are foreign-born across time and also displays the percentage of foreign-born in the 
total labor force for reference. Immigrants are consistently disproportionately concentrated in the 
home services field given their percentage of the labor market, and this differential appears to 
increase dramatically over time. The role of home production workers in long-term care is as 
essential as that of health care workers, because individuals who decide to remain in their own 
homes must rely on the assistance of direct care workers for health related purposes as well as 
home services workers for homeowner related tasks.  
As the level of immigration has continued to increase, many economists have 
investigated how foreign-born workers impact U.S. labor markets. Previous studies have 
established that immigration flows lead to changes in the compositions of local labor markets, 
specifically by increasing the percentage of low-skilled workers in the labor force (Cortés and 
Tessada 2011; Lewis 2011). However, despite this change in the local labor force composition, 
most researchers have found that influxes of low-skilled immigrants do not dramatically impact 
the wages of low-skilled native workers. The three most common theoretical explanations for 
this phenomenon include the displacement of natives away from immigration flows, the 
imperfect substitution between low-skilled immigrants and low-skilled natives, and the 
development of production technologies via capital-skill complementarity. Most empirical 
evidence supports the last two of these three theories. 
The impact of low-skilled immigration on elderly long-term care choices, however, 
depends not only on the wage effects but also on other market effects for long-term care services, 
such as price and availability. Cortés and Tessada (2011) find that low-skilled immigration 
increases the average hours of work for high-skilled U.S. women while also decreasing their 
hours of household production and increasing their expenditures on housekeeping services. 
These results indicate that high-skilled women substitute away from home production when the 
prices of services that are substitutes for home production are lowered. Cortés (2008) supports 
this price mechanism theory by finding that a 10 percent increase in the share of low-skilled 
immigrants in a city’s labor force reduces the prices of immigrant-intensive non-tradable services 
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– such as gardening, housekeeping, babysitting, and dry cleaning – by approximately 2 percent. 
The main mechanism behind this price change is reduced wages for low-skilled immigrants and 
for low-skilled native workers who are most likely to compete directly with immigrants in the 
labor market (specifically, those of Hispanic origin and with low levels of English proficiency). 
The absence of any significant change in native wage from immigration suggests that low-skilled 
immigrants and low-skilled natives are imperfect substitutes in production. Thus, an increase in 
low-skilled immigration can decrease the price of immigrant-intensive services without 
significantly impacting the wages of native low-skilled workers. This is an important result for 
my analysis, as the long-term care field can be classified as immigrant-intensive. 
Another line of research, led by Ethan Lewis (2004, 2011, and 2013), highlights the 
impact of immigration on the economy’s development of production technologies. Lewis finds 
that increases in low-skilled relative supply driven by increases in low-skilled immigrants are 
associated with slower growth in capital-labor and capital-output ratios, which suggests that 
manufacturing automation complements middle-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers. 
As a result, the fixed machinery rental rates act as a buffer for the relative wages of low-skilled 
labor from the effect of a positive increase in the labor supply. This result indicates that 
immigrants can impact both the share of low-skilled labor as well as the capital growth in local 
labor markets without greatly influencing the wages of native workers or the prices of goods and 
services. Since the long-term care industry is divided into less labor-intensive sectors (nursing 
homes) and more labor-intensive sectors (home based care), this result may have an impact on 
the long-term care decisions of elderly individuals.  
Given this past literature – as well as the high concentration of immigrants in health care 
and home service occupations and the predominance of low-skilled workers in those occupations 
– it is possible that low-skilled immigration can influence the long-term care decisions of elderly 
individuals in need of assistance via decreased costs of long-term care and/or local shifts towards 
more labor-intensive care. The cost mechanism suggests that an increase in the labor supply 
would decrease the cost and increase the availability of hiring home service and health care 
workers. If the costs of hiring home service and health care workers both in home and in 
institutions decrease by the same amount, then any resulting change in the living arrangements of 
elderly individuals will depend on those individuals’ preferences. Given their expressed 
preferences for own-home residency, this mechanism suggests that we would expect to see a 
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decrease in the probability of an elderly individual living in an institution. Finally, the capital-
skill complementarity mechanism suggests that an increase in low-skilled immigration could 
induce the local markets to shift towards more labor intensive and less capital intensive care, 
which in this case is private home living. Thus, regardless of the true mechanism, both 
price/wage effects and capital-skill complementarity predict that an increase in low-skilled 
workers in a local area will reduce the level of institutionalization if elderly individuals prefer to 
live in their own homes as they age. My analysis tests this overall prediction without 
investigating the specific factors driving the results. Thus, I am not able to clearly adjudicate 
amongst these proposed mechanisms. 
One challenge with identifying the impact of immigrants on local labor markets is the 
potential endogeneity of immigrant flows. It is highly probable that factors that motivate new 
immigrants to settle within a particular geographical area in a given year, such as labor market 
opportunities, may also be correlated with any outcome variables in which researchers are 
interested. To address this endogeneity, Altonji and Card (1991) introduce an instrumental 
variable strategy that exploits the tendency of immigrants to migrate to places in which there are 
already established immigrant communities. This research builds off of the work of Bartel 
(1989), who finds that the main determinant of a recent immigrant’s location is the percentage of 
his/her own ethnic group that resides in the metropolitan statistical area. Lewis (2011), as well as 
Cortés (2008) and Cortés and Tessada (2011), expand on Altonji and Card’s instrumental 
variable strategy by breaking up the established immigrant communities by country of origin and 
predicting that immigrants tend to migrate to areas in which there are larger established 
immigrant communities from their own home countries. As I will discuss in more detail in 
Section IV, my empirical strategy closely follows that of Cortés and Tessada (2011).  
 Given the high rates of immigrant workers in the direct care occupation, many 
researchers in fields outside of economics have proposed that an increase of immigrant long-term 
care workers could be a potential solution, either in the short-run or the long-run, to direct care 
worker shortages in the U.S. (Hussein and Manthorpe, 2005; Fujisawa and Colombo, 2009; 
Leutz, 2010; Lowell et al., 2010; Walsh and O’Shea, 2010; Chen et al., 2013; Hess and Henrici, 
2013). However, none – in economics or other fields – have directly analyzed the current and 
past impact of low-skilled immigrants on the living arrangements and health outcomes of the 
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elderly, who interact with direct care workers at a higher frequency than any other age group. My 
analysis seeks to fill this void in the research literature.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 To investigate the relationship between immigration and the long-term care choices of 
elderly individuals, I use multiple publicly available data sources.  
 
 A. Census Data 
My analysis uses the 5 percent samples of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census, as well as 
the 1 percent sample of the 1970 Census and the 2006-2014 American Community Surveys 
(ACS) – which represents approximately 1 percent of the total U.S. population – from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. I use this census data to measure the concentration of 
low-skilled immigrants across U.S. states and to develop my instrument, which is described in 
more detail in Section IV. Low-skilled workers are defined as those who have less than a high 
school diploma, and immigrants (or “foreign-born,” which I use synonymously throughout this 
paper) are all individuals born outside of the U.S. except for those born abroad to American 
parents (thus the category contain both naturalized citizens and non-citizens). Those born in U.S. 
territories are coded as non-immigrants. Table 1 shows the share of the entire U.S. labor force 
that is low-skilled in Panel 1 and the share of the entire U.S. labor force that is low-skilled 
immigrants in Panel 2. Note that there is significant variation in both measures across both states 
and time, which I exploit in my empirical strategy.  
I also use this combined Census data to measure the probability of institutionalization for 
elderly individuals in the U.S. For the majority of my analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals 
over the age of 64 who are non-immigrants (or natives) in the U.S. in order to focus specifically 
on the impact of low-skilled immigrants on the elderly population without capturing any changes 
driven by elderly immigrants. The ACS does not include the institutionalized population in their 
sample until 2006, and thus I can only use 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2006-2014 as flow years for 
my instrumental variable (with 1970 as the base year). Table 2 provides basic summary statistics 
for all available years (Panel 1), for only years in which both the institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized population is surveyed (Panel 2), and for only U.S. natives who are 65+ 
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years old in the focused years of data (Panel 3). Panel 3 is the sample with which I focus my 
analysis. Note that approximately 4 percent of this sample of 406 million is institutionalized. 
 
B. Vital Statistics Data 
 In addition to the Census data, I also use the Multiple Cause-of-Death Mortality Data 
from the National Vital Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics, which is 
publicly available for download through the National Bureau of Economic Research. This 
dataset allows me to analyze the impact of low-skilled immigration on two final measures of 
elderly health: age at death and aggregate mortality rates. These measures are likely to be 
imperfect measures of elderly health and wellbeing as they measure quantity, rather than quality, 
of life. However, given data constraints due to the necessity of available geographic identifiers 
for my identification strategy, these two measures must serve as proxies for health and 
wellbeing.  
 The Vital Statistics data includes information from all death certificates on deaths 
occurring within the U.S. between 1959 and 2015.3 For most years, this includes information on 
age at death, sex, race, Hispanic origin, educational attainment, state of residence at death, state 
of occurrence of death, and place of death. Note that no geographic identifiers are available from 
2005 onward in the public data. I further restrict the sample by dropping those individuals who 
report an age at death that is above the 99th percentile of their sex’s age distribution (which is 
100 years for females and 97 years for males) due to the presence of a handful of highly 
improbable ages at death (196 observations report age at death as 120 years or greater). Using 
the state of residence at death variable4, I am able to attach the Vital Statistics data to the data on 
low-skilled immigrants and low-skilled labor force shares from the Census. This restricts my 
final years of analysis to 1980, 1990, and 2000-2004. Again, I focus specifically on the native 
elderly (65+ years old) population. Table 3 presents basic summary statistics for the full sample 																																																								
3 The one exception is the year 1972, which contains only a 50% sample of deaths. To make this 
year comparable to other years, I weight each of the available observations by 2. 
4 I use the state of residence at death, instead of the state of occurrence of death, because this 
variable better represents where an individual resided prior to death. Note that “residence” does 
not require any legal residency conditions nor a specific mailing address; rather, the variable 
measures where the individual lived immediately prior to death. Given that my identification 
strategy hinges on local labor markets impacting the health outcomes of elderly individuals, state 
of residence will more accurately identify the appropriate labor markets.   
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(Panel 1), for the full sample only in years that are used in my analysis (Panel 2), and for only 
U.S. natives who are 65+ years old in the focused years of data (Panel 3). Of the approximately 
11 million individuals 65 years old or older who died in 1980, 1990, or 2000-2004, the average 
age at death is 80.57 years.  
 To construct aggregate mortality rates, I use the state-by-age population counts from the 
National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (Cancer-SEER) program 
to create the denominator and death counts from the Vital Statistics data for the numerator. I age 
adjust the mortality rates to account for large increases in longevity that may have occurred 
unevenly across states over the time period studied. This adjustment creates a measure of the 
mortality rate that holds the age distribution constant over time, with 1990 as the reference year. 
Figure 11 plots unadjusted and age-adjusted mortality rates for the entire U.S. population over 
time. The relative flatness of the unadjusted series compared to the age-adjusted line highlights 
the importance of controlling for the aging of the U.S. population in order to avoid any non-
causal correlation between mortality and low-skilled labor. In addition, all of the analyses 
reported are population-weighted, which allows estimates to refer directly to overall changes in 
U.S. mortality rates rather than that of a typical state’s mortality rates. This set-up closely mirrors 
that of Stevens et al. (2015), with Figure 11 replicating the same graph reported in their 
appendix.  
 When investigating the heterogeneity of mortality outcomes, I examine samples of the 
population by place of death. The mortality data files indicate whether an individual died in a 
hospital, nursing home, residence, or other location. Unfortunately, these place of death codes 
are only available beginning in 1979, and they underwent two major changes in 1989 and 2003. 
In order to allow comparability across these time periods, I follow Stevens et al. (2015) and 
recode the place of death categories into hospitals, nursing homes, and other, where nursing 
homes include “other institutions providing care” prior to 1989 as well as “nursing home/long-
term care” following 2003. Figure 12 presents the fraction of all deaths by place of death. Note 
that there do not appear to be any noticeable breaks in the series in 1989 or 2003. 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
A. Identification Strategy 
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 I exploit the variation in the concentration of low-skilled immigrants across states and 
years to identify their effect on elderly individuals’ long-term care choices and outcomes, 
specifically on the probability of institutionalization, age at death, and mortality rates. However, 
factors that motivate new immigrants to settle within a particular geographical area in a given 
year, such as labor market opportunities, are also likely to be correlated with living arrangement 
and health care options for the elderly. To address this source of endogeneity, I use an 
instrumental variable strategy adapted from Cortés and Tessada (2011). This strategy exploits the 
tendency of immigrants to migrate to places in which there are already established immigrant 
communities from their home countries by using the past distribution of immigrants (from the 
year 1970) from a given country across different U.S. states to allocate current U.S.-wide stocks 
of immigrants from that country to different states. This estimates increases in immigration that 
are dependent on past migration settlement patterns and exogenous to current economic 
conditions, which might have their own independent effect on the health and living arrangements 
of the elderly. 
 Formally, the instrument for the total number of low-skilled immigrants between the ages 
of 16 and 64 in state s and year t is represented by  !""#$%&'()!"!"#$!""#$%&'()!!"#$!  × !"!""#$%&!"#!" 
where j is a country of origin in the 1970 census, s is the state of residence, and t is the year. The 
first term of the above expression represents the fraction of all immigrants in the U.S. from 
country j that live in state s in 1970. The second term represents the total number of all low-
skilled immigrants between the ages of 16 and 64 from country j who live in the U.S. in year t, 
where low-skilled is defined as having less than a high school diploma. The product of the two 
terms forms the predicted total number of low-skilled immigrants (aged 16-64) from country j in 
state s at time t. The summation across all countries of origin transforms the entire expression to 
represent the predicted total number of low-skilled immigrants (aged 16-64) in state s at time t. 
The flow years used in my analysis are 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2006-2014 (for 
institutionalization) or 1980, 1990, and 2000-2004 (for age at death and mortality rates).  
 I use the log of the above expression as an instrument for the natural log of the low-
skilled labor force share in state s and year t. Thus, the first stage regression of this instrumental 
variable strategy is as follows: 
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(1) Lst = δ * log(  !""#$%&'()!"!"#$!""#$%&'()!!"#$!  × !"!""#$%&'()!") + αs + λt + Ωst + Χistβ + εst 
where Lst = ln(!"#$$%&'()*+!"! !"#$%&'()!"!"#$% !"#$%!" ) 
and i is individual, s is state, and t is year. The dependent variable Lst represents the natural log 
of the low-skilled labor force share in state s and year t. The vector Χist represents individual-
level characteristics, which vary depending on the dependent variable in the second stage 
regression. State fixed effects, represented by αs, control for time-invariant state-level 
characteristics, while year fixed effects, represented by λt, control for time variant characteristics 
that impact all states. Later regressions also include state-time trends (represented by Ωst). Given 
that the main independent variable varies only at the state-by-year level, all regressions run with 
individual-level data (except those specified) cluster standard errors at the state-by-year level. 
When appropriate, regressions are also weighted by person-level frequency weights.  
Note that this instrument is very similar to the strategy developed by Cortés and Tessada 
(2011). For this instrumental variable strategy to estimate the causal effect of low-skilled 
immigration, the following two assumptions must hold: first, any unobserved factors that 
determine the location of immigrants in different states across the U.S. in 1970 must not be 
correlated with changes in the relative living arrangement and health outcomes for the elderly in 
different states in the flow years; second, the total number of low-skilled immigrants in the U.S. 
in a given year must be exogenous to differential time varying shocks to U.S. states.  
 Table 4 provides estimations of the first stage regression run over individual-level Census 
data. The first panel of Table 4 estimates equation (1) as described above, while Panels 2 and 3 
adjust the terms slightly to more closely follow the instrument specified by Cortés and Tessada 
(2011). In particular, Cortés and Tessada restrict the measure of low-skilled workers, on both the 
left and the right hand side of equation (1), to only those individuals who report being in the 
labor force, not living in group quarters, and not enrolled in school (replicated in Panel 2). This 
causes the main coefficient of interest to jump up from 0.237 to 0.344 without any change in 
statistical significance. Further, Cortés and Tessada drop specific birthplace country codes that 
they believe to be vague in the Census data (replicated in Panel 3). This has little to no impact on 
the main coefficient of interest. While the coefficient is larger for those specifications that more 
closely follow Cortés and Tessada’s identification strategy, I believe that the additional 
restrictions detailed in Panels 2 and 3 are too restrictive for the instrument. For example, young 
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immigrants who are still in school and/or living in group quarters and not reported as part of the 
labor force may still play a role in home production, which could influence the long-term care 
choices of the elderly. It's also possible that immigrants currently in school for a health care 
degree could influence the health services market through part-time work. Thus, for the 
remainder of my analysis, I present first stage results as detailed above and illustrated in Table 4, 
Panel 1. The results in Column 4 indicate that a 10 percent increase in the predicted number of 
low-skilled immigrants increases the share of low-skilled workers in the labor force by 
approximately 2.7 percent. Despite the small differences in our definitions for the instrumental 
variable, this result is very similar to that found by Cortés and Tessada (2011) using city-specific 
data. Note also that the estimate is highly statistically significant with a large F-statistic for the 
excluded instrument, indicating that the log of predicted low-skilled immigrants is a valid 
instrument for the natural log of low-skilled labor force shares.5  
 The literature also suggests that this instrumental variable strategy may work differently 
for different time periods. Ultimately, this paper pools available data from many years in order to 
maximize the number of years in which my three second stage outcome variables are available. 
Appendix Table 1 presents first stage results using my main instrumental variable strategy 
described above but with varying base and flow years. The results indicate that 1990 and 2000 
are necessary flow years for the first stage regressions to estimate a significant impact of 
predicted low-skilled immigration on the low-skilled labor force share (and also yield an F-
statistic greater than 10). Given these results, I continue to use 1970 as the base year along with 
1980, 1990, 2000, and 2006-2014 (for institutionalization) or 1980, 1990, and 2000-2004 (for 
age at death and mortality rates) as flow years for the remainder of my analysis. 
 
B. Econometric Specifications  
1. Probability of Institutionalization 
 I begin my analysis by investigating the impact of predicted low-skilled labor force 
shares on the institutionalization of elderly individuals. Institutionalization is a clear outcome 
from long-term care decisions, and, while institutionalization is not definitively representative of 																																																								
5 The F-statistic for the instruments excluded from the second stage regression is always greater 
than 10, providing evidence that the instrument is not weakly correlated with the endogenous 
variable and thus fulfills the relevance assumption of instrument variable strategies (Staiger and 
Stock, 1997).  
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an individual’s wellbeing, the measure can indicate whether elderly individuals are choosing 
their (on average) preferred living arrangements. The following equation represents the second 
stage regression of the two-stage least squares strategy:  
(2) Iist = ϕ * !!" + αs + λt + Ωst + Χistβ + εist 
where i corresponds to the individual, and thus Iist represents the probability that an individual is  
institutionalized (thus making equation (2) a linear probability model). !!" represents the natural 
log of the predicted low-skilled labor force share in state s and year t from the first stage 
regression. Thus, ϕ is the main coefficient of interest. State fixed effects, represented by αs, and 
year fixed effects, represented by λt, are included, and later regressions also control for state-time 
trends (Ωst). As before, the vector Χist represents individual-level characteristics, which include 
sex, race, Hispanic origin, age, age-squared, marital status, and educational attainment in 
equation (2). As in the first stage, I cluster standard errors at the state-by-year level and weight 
the observations by frequency weights provided by the Census. The sample is also typically 
restricted to individuals aged 65 and up who are natives of the U.S. 
 
2. Age at Death 
 The next step in my analysis is to estimate the impact of low-skilled labor force changes 
on the health and wellbeing of the elderly. Due to data constraints, I must use mortality outcomes 
as proxies for wellbeing. As discussed previously, this is a crude measure of wellbeing as it is 
indicative only of quantity of life, not quality of life. Thus, any results should be interpreted 
cautiously. The first end of life outcome I analyze is age at death. The second stage regression 
for this dependent variable is: 
(3) Ageist = ϕ * !!" + αs + λt + Ωst + Χistβ + εist 
where Ageist represents the age at death of individual i in state s and at time t. All other 
parameters are defined the same as those in equation (2) except for Χist, which now only includes 
variables for sex, race, and marital status due to changes in the death certificates over time. Later 
specifications of equation (3) also include indicator variables for educational attainment, which 
require dropping the year 1980 from the analysis. As before, standard errors are clustered at the 




3. Mortality Rate 
 Age at death is an interesting outcome variable because it refers to the direct impact of 
predicted changes in low-skilled labor force shares driven by low-skilled immigration on an 
individual’s longevity. However, using this dependent variable may introduce bias from the 
differential selection of elderly individuals into the 65+ sample as the result of low-skilled 
immigration. Thus, as discussed in more detail in Section V, in following with the existing 
literature on elderly mortality, the next phase of my analysis uses mortality rates at the state-by-
year level as the second stage dependent variable. The regression for this second stage is as 
follows: 
(4) Hst = ϕ * !!" + αs + λt + Ωst + Χstβ + εst 
where Hst is the natural log of the mortality rate in state s and year t. Again, this regression 
includes a measure of the natural log of the predicted low-skilled labor force share in state s and 
year t from the first stage regression (!!"), state fixed effects (αs), time fixed effects (λt), and 
state-specific time trends (Ωst). Instead of individual-level controls, however, equation (4) 
includes state-level demographic controls including the fraction of the population who are less 
than 5 years old, between 5 and 17 years old, between 18 and 30 years old, greater than 65 years 
old, high school graduates, with some college education, college graduates, black, and “other” 
(non-white and non-black) race. Later regressions also include the fraction of the population that 
is married and the fraction that is female. Finally, standard errors for these regressions are 
clustered at the state level, which leaves only seven observations within a cluster. As with 
equations (2) and (3), the main coefficient of interest in equation (4) is ϕ. The dependent variable 
varies depending on the specification, with my main specification estimating the natural log of 
the 65+ population’s mortality rate.  
 
V. Results 
 A. Probability of Institutionalization  
Estimates of the effect of changes in the low-skilled labor force share on an elderly 
individual’s probability of institutionalization, as specified in equation (2), are presented in Table 
5. Columns 1-3 report first stage results, as reported earlier in Panel 1 of Table 4, and Columns 
4-6 illustrate estimates from the second stage. Columns 1 and 4 begin the analysis with a simple 
fixed effects model, which includes only the main explanatory variable as well as state and year 
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fixed effects. The results in Column 4 indicate that a 10 percent increase in the predicted low-
skilled labor force share decreases a U.S. native elderly individual’s probability of living in an 
institution by 0.002 percentage points.6 While the magnitude of this coefficient is small, it must 
be interpreted relative to the average rate of institutionalization for the sample. Over all of the 
years used in my analysis, only 4 percent of elderly natives over the age of 64 in the U.S. are 
institutionalized. Thus, a 0.002 percentage point decrease represents a 5 percent change in the 
probability of institutionalization, which is quite large. In addition, the coefficient is highly 
statistically significant. Note that a 10 percent increase in the low-skilled labor force share is a 
reasonable benchmark for cross-state and time comparisons, as the summary statistics in Table 1 
indicate that the low-skilled labor force share varies widely across years (64 percent of the total 
U.S. labor force in 1980 to 15 percent in 2014) and states (in 2014, 20 percent of the labor force 
in Texas and 9 percent in North Dakota).  
Columns 2 and 5 add state-specific linear time trends to the regressions, and Columns 3 
and 6 further add basic individual-level controls. Adding these controls slightly decreases the 
magnitude of the main coefficient and increases the standard errors, but the coefficients remain 
significant at the 10% level. The final estimate in Column 6 suggests that a 10 percent increase in 
the low-skilled labor force share decreases an individual’s probability of living in an institution 
by 0.0014 percentage points, or 3.6 percent. To check the fit of this linear probability model to 
the data, I further test for the predicted values of probability institutionalized from each of the 
regressions in Columns 4-6. I find that these values are mostly between 0 and 1, indicating that 
further analysis using a probit or logit model would likely yield similar results. 
As discussed in Section IV, in order for the results in Table 5 to be causal estimates, the 
exclusion restriction for this identification strategy must hold. The exclusion restriction requires 
that immigrants’ settlement patterns must not be correlated with changes in the long-term care 
markets (and mortality) in different states over time outside of their influence on the composition 
of local labor markets. If, for example, the distribution of immigrants in 1970 is related in any 
way to the investment in long-term care facilities throughout the time period analyzed, then I 
could see changes in the probability of institutionalization driven by that investment and not by 
																																																								
6 Given that the independent variable is measured in natural logs, I multiply its coefficient by 0.1 
to interpret the coefficient as the percentage point change in the probability of institutionalization 
from a 10 percent (rather than 100 percent) increase in the low-skilled labor force share.  
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current changes in the local labor markets. To test for bias from a violation of the exclusion 
restriction, I look at the probability of institutionalization more generally by looking specifically 
at children under the age of 10 instead of elderly individuals. Institutionalized children 10 years 
old and younger are likely to be living in the same types of institutions as institutionalized 
elderly individuals (primarily skilled nursing facilities, as opposed to correctional institutions), 
but they are less likely to be affected by changes in the local labor markets for home production 
and health care. Thus, if my results are driven by anything related to historic immigrant 
concentrations that impacts institutionalization or health differentially by states over time – 
besides labor market composition – then I should see similar second stage estimates for this 
sample of individuals. Table 6 presents the results of this placebo test. The second stage 
estimates in Columns 4-6 are all precisely estimated zeros. The first stage estimates are very 
similar to those reported in Table 5, indicating that any changes in the second stage relative to 
the second stage results in Table 5 are driven by changes in the reduced form estimates. Thus, 
Table 6 suggests that changes in the low-skilled labor force share do not impact the probability 
of institutionalization for young children. This result provides evidence that the exclusion 
restriction is not violated.  
Another potential threat to the validity of my results is the possibility of endogenous 
sorting of the elderly across states. If elderly individuals are endogenously sorting either by 
health status or income to certain states, especially those that contain well known retiree 
communities, in order to benefit from higher low-skilled labor force shares and/or higher 
numbers of low-skilled immigrants as predicted from the 1970 immigrant settlement patterns, 
then my estimates may be biased. Particularly, if those who have relatively higher levels of 
income as well as better health statuses are more able to make this inter-state move, then the 
estimates in Table 5 are likely to suffer from a positive bias. To test this potential threat, I run 
robustness checks that exclude Florida, Arizona, and Texas (well known retiree communities and 
hubs of low-skilled labor) from my analysis. The results, presented in Appendix Table 2, are 
quantitatively similar to those in Table 5.  
Given that the rate of institutionalization varies widely by subgroup, it is a possible that 
the predicted low-skilled labor force share may impact an individual’s probability of 
institutionalization differently depending on that individual’s characteristics. I test for these 
heterogeneous effects by including interaction terms between the main independent variable (the 
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natural log of the low-skilled labor force share) and numerous individual-level characteristics. 
The results can be found in Appendix Table 3. All of the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
highly statistically significant. In addition, a regression including interaction terms between sex 
and all other control variables (reported in the last column of Appendix Table 3) yields all highly 
significant interaction terms. An F-test that restricts these interaction term coefficients to be zero 
also results in a large test statistic and thus rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the 
same. These results suggest that the relationship between institutionalization, the low-skilled 
labor force share, and an individual’s characteristics is quite different across subgroups. As a 
result, my preferred method for testing for heterogeneity is to run separate regressions for each 
relevant subgroup. 
Table 7 presents the estimates of heterogeneous effects by age, sex, race, Hispanic origin, 
educational attainment, metropolitan status, and report of a difficulty and/or disability. Column 1 
contains second stage results from regressions including state and year fixed effects, state time 
trends, and basic individual-level controls. While not reported in Table 7, the F-statistic for the 
excluded instrument in each first stage regression is greater than 10, indicating that my 
instrument predicts well for all of these separate regressions. As expected, the first stage 
coefficients are also similar across subgroups (note that the only reason I would expect the first 
stage to be different is due to differential weighting of the populations of each subgroup across 
states and years in the U.S.). The only regression where the first stage is substantially different is 
when I break down the population by difficulties and disabilities. This difference is driven by the 
exclusion of some years of data from the analyses of these subgroups due to data limitations. 
First stage results are reported in Appendix Table 4. Column 2 of Table 7 reports the mean rate 
of institutionalization for each subgroup. Finally, Column 3 converts the coefficient in Column 1 
from a percentage point interpretation to a percentage by multiplying the coefficient by 0.1 and 
dividing by the mean of institutionalization.7 This yields an estimate of the percent change in 
institutionalization for the sample given a 10% increase in the low-skilled labor force share.  
																																																								
7 Again, since the independent variable is measured in natural logs, multiplying its coefficient by 
0.1 changes the interpretation of the coefficient from the percentage point change in probability 
of institutionalization due to a 100 percent increase in the low-skilled labor force share to that 
due to a 10 percent increase in the low-skilled labor force share. Dividing by the mean of 
institutionalization for the sample converts the interpretation to a percent, rather than percentage 
point, change.  
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The first 5 rows of Table 7 analyze heterogeneity among increasingly older age groups. 
Note that the coefficient in Column 1 increases with age, but the percentage change reported in 
Column 3 remains relatively constant due to higher rates of institutionalization among the oldest 
in the sample. The percentage is higher for the 65+ age group than the remaining groups 
(excluding the 85+). This result could be implying that the living arrangements of the younger 
elderly are more likely to be affected by increases in low-skilled labor, perhaps due to younger 
elderly individuals being on the margin of entering institutions (as compared to the oldest in the 
sample, who might need to enter institutions regardless of the local labor market). However, the 
estimates across age groups are not statistically different from one another. In addition, the 
inclusion of state time trends in the regressions eliminates most of the significance (see 
Appendix Table 4 for the gradual addition of controls in the 2nd stage regressions), so that the 
only age group coefficient in Column 1 that is statistically significant is that for the 65+. This is 
the result of a loss of power when the analysis is broken up into smaller groups. Note that this 
lack of statistical significance at conventional levels continues throughout the remainder of Table 
7. 
Despite the lack of significance, the magnitudes of the coefficients do give insight into 
possible heterogeneous effects. When broken down by sex, the coefficients suggest that elderly 
women primarily drive the total impact of the labor force composition on institutionalization. 
Given the higher life expectancy of women relative to men, as well as the higher probability that 
women will outlive their spouses, elderly women often require higher levels of non-familial 
long-term care. Thus, given their high prevalence as consumers in the long-term care industry, it 
is intuitive that any change in the local labor force would impact the housing decisions of women 
more so than men.  
Separating the analysis by race implies that white elders are more affected than their 
black counterparts. In addition, there is a much larger coefficient of interest for the Hispanic 
population relative to the non-Hispanic. This result is particularly prominent given the lower 
average rate of institutionalization for the Hispanic elderly (2.94 percent) compared to the non-
Hispanic elderly (4.05 percent). The reason for why this estimate for Hispanics is larger is not 
immediately clear. It is possible, however, that the differential impact is driven by Hispanic 
immigration. Hispanic natives likely live in states with higher levels of Hispanic immigrants, and 
thus they may be more willing to look within their own ethnic communities to hire home health 
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care providers and/or home production workers in order to remain in their own homes as they 
age. Note also that females for all race/ethnicity groups, except the Hispanic elderly, are more 
impacted by labor force composition changes than their male peers.  
Looking at the results by educational attainment suggests a slightly larger impact for the 
more highly educated. However, these results vary dramatically depending on the controls 
included in the regression (see Appendix Table 4). Elderly individuals living in metropolitan 
areas appear to be driving the total negative affect of low-skilled labor on institutionalization, 
though the number of elderly outside of metropolitan areas is too small to yield any precise 
estimates. In addition, the impact of the labor force composition on institutionalization is quite 
large and significant for the unmarried elderly population (as compared to the married 
population, which experiences little change in institutionalization due to local labor market 
changes). Finally, while slightly messy due to data availability limitations and coding changes 
across years, the results by difficulty/disability indicate that only the probability of 
institutionalization for those elderly individuals with a reported difficulty and/or disability are 
affected by increases in the low-skilled labor force share. This result – along with those 
indicating heterogeneity by sex and marital status– supports the hypothesis that elderly 
individuals most in need of purchasing long-term care are the most affected by changes in the 
low-skilled labor force share. However, the lack of precision within subgroups makes it difficult 
to draw definite conclusions. 
 
 B. Age at Death 
 The next stage of my analysis shifts to using the Vital Statistics mortality data to 
investigate the impact of immigration on the health and wellbeing of elderly individuals. The 
available data, however, only provides information on elderly mortality, not more intermediate 
health outcomes or more broad measures of wellbeing. Nonetheless, I use the mortality data to 
look at elderly age at death and aggregate mortality rates, which I use as proxies for elderly 
health and wellbeing. Table 8 presents the results from equation (3), which estimates the impact 
of the predicted low-skilled labor force share on age at death. Note again that the F-statistic for 
the excluded instrument is well above ten for all of the first stage regressions in Columns 1-4. 
The coefficients on predicted low-skilled immigrants, while still positive and statistically 
significant, are larger in magnitude in these first stage regressions than in the previous first stage 
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regressions using institutionalization as a second stage outcome variable. This difference is due 
to the use of slightly different years in the analysis of age at death. The second stage results for 
age at death are reported in Columns 5-8 of Table 8. As before, I begin with a simple fixed 
effects model in Column 5, which yields a large and highly significant negative main coefficient 
of interest. Adding state-specific linear time trends in Column 6 flips the sign of the coefficient 
from negative to positive but retains statistical significance at the 5% level. The main estimate in 
Column 6 indicates that a 10 percent increase in the predicted low-skilled labor force share 
increases an elderly individual’s age at death on average by 0.11 years, or – given that the mean 
of age at death for this elderly sample is 80.6 – approximately 0.14 percent.8 This estimate is 
robust to the inclusion of basic individual-level controls in Column 7.  
As with the institutionalization analysis, there is the potential for endogenous sorting of 
the elderly to bias the coefficients reported in Table 8. Specifically, if more well-off and/or 
healthy elderly individuals move to states with historically higher low-skilled labor force shares 
or flows of low-skilled immigrants in order to benefit from this type of labor, then this 
movement of individuals could be causing bias. As discussed above, this bias is likely to be 
positive since the higher socioeconomic elderly have both better health outcomes on average and 
more resources to move across states. To decrease the probability that this endogeneity is biasing 
the main results, Columns 4 and 8 add controls for fractions of the population in different age 
groups (0-5, 5-17, 18-30, and 31-64) to the first and second stage regressions. The addition of 
these state-level controls actually increases the second stage coefficient of interest, though the 95 
percent confidence intervals for the coefficients overlap. As with the institutionalization analysis, 
I also run robustness checks that exclude Florida, Arizona, and Texas from the analysis. The 
results, presented in Appendix Table 2, are similar to those in Table 8.  
 Table 9 presents the results from four separate placebo tests on the effect of changes in 
the low-skilled labor force share on age at death. As with the institutionalization analysis, these 
placebo tests investigate whether my assumptions for causal interpretation hold. Broadly, they 
are designed to test whether immigrants’ settlement patterns are influencing elderly health 
outcomes in any way not associated with changes in the local labor markets for home production 																																																								
8 Again, since the independent variable is measured in natural logs, multiplying its coefficient by 
0.1 changes the interpretation of the coefficient to the change in age at death due to a 10 percent 
increase in the low-skilled labor force share. Dividing by the mean of age at death for the sample 
converts the interpretation to a percent, rather than percentage point, change.  
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and health care. Panel 1 looks for changes in health outcomes as the result of historical 
immigration by restricting the analysis to native children less than 10 years old and those less 
than 5 years old. I use children for this falsification test because they are less likely to be affected 
by changes in local labor markets. Thus, if my results for this placebo test are similar to those for 
the 65+ sample, then the test would suggest that there are additional factors besides the labor 
market composition that impact health and are driving my main results in Table 8. The second 
stage result using the morality rate of those under 5 is a relatively precisely estimated zero, while 
the result for that of those under 10 is positive but smaller in magnitude than the estimate from 
the elderly sample and not statistically significant. While the small magnitudes of these 
coefficients suggest a small effect, these magnitudes are also expected given that variation in the 
dependent variable is conditional on the age group to which I restrict the analysis. In percentage 
terms, the coefficient for the 10 years old and under age group is actually larger in magnitude 
than that for the 65+ sample. However, this estimate is not precise.  
Panels 2-4 of Table 9 continue the falsification tests by restricting my sample to those 
who died from specific causes of death with the goal of analyzing those who experienced a 
sudden and unpredictable death that is unlikely to be related to the labor force. The exclusion 
restriction for my instrumental variable strategy states that immigrants’ settlement patterns must 
not be correlated with elderly mortality except through their impact on contemporary local labor 
market compositions. Thus, analyzing the age at death of those whose deaths are not impacted by 
labor markets allows me to test whether there are any additional factors driving my main results 
in Table 8. Unfortunately, each of the three causes that I analyze is slightly flawed in its 
requirement of being uncorrelated with the composition of the local labor market. Although I run 
the tests and report them in the remaining panels of Table 9, I am not convinced that they are true 
placebo tests for the reasons that follow. Panel 2 of Table 9 restricts the sample to those 
individuals who die in a motor vehicle accident and yields mixed results by age restrictions, with 
a small but positive coefficient for the 65+. However, previous research has shown that motor 
vehicle accidents may fluctuate cyclically, and thus it is possible that they are impacted by 
changes in the labor force composition. Panel 3 next restricts the analysis to death by stroke. 
These results are consistently positive for both all ages and the 65+, with the 65+ coefficient 
significant at the 10% level. While initially appealing as a sudden type of death, further medical 
research indicates that stroke has known and preventable causes. In addition, individuals who die 
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from strokes often suffered previous strokes prior to death. Thus, this cause of death is less 
random than is necessary to be considered a falsification test. In fact, given the influence of 
medical care on the probability of death by stroke, the results in Panel 3 may even be supportive 
of the theory that elderly individuals are healthier when the low-skilled labor force share 
increases. Finally, Panel 4 restricts to death by “sudden death,” which is defined as “other sudden 
death, cause unknown.” This is my best placebo by cause of death, but the small number of 
observations in this analysis yields a loss of the first stage and widely imprecise estimates in the 
second stage. The lack of good falsification tests for age at death is a weakness of my analysis 
with the mortality data.  
I next test for the existence of heterogeneity by including interaction terms between my 
main dependent variable and numerous individual-level characteristics (see Appendix Table 5). 
The significance of these interaction terms provides preliminary evidence that the main effect of 
low-skilled labor on age at death is statistically different for an individual depending on that 
individual’s characteristics. Thus, as with the institutionalization analysis, my preferred method 
for examining heterogeneity in the effect of low-skilled workers on age at death is to run separate 
regressions by subgroups. Table 10 presents the results of this testing by age, sex, and place of 
death, with Column 1 stating the main coefficient of interest from the main regression 
specification, Column 2 stating the mean age at death for the subgroup, and Column 3 converting 
the coefficient in Column 1 into a percentage interpretation. 
The first 5 rows of Table 10 analyze heterogeneity among increasingly older age groups. 
The main coefficients in Column 1 are largest for the relatively younger age groups (65+ and 
70+). This result is expected, as these subgroups include more individuals who are further away 
from their own life expectancies and thus have more time to benefit from changes in the local 
labor markets. The coefficients decrease in magnitude and eventually become negative for 
progressively older age groups. Specifically, the coefficient is negative, large, and statistically 
significant for the 85+ group. This result suggests that, conditional on living to the age of 85, an 
increase in the predicted low-skilled labor force share decreases an average individual’s age at 
death. The conditionality of this interpretation on reaching the age of 85 forces the impact of 
low-skilled labor to be small in magnitude, given that individuals in this subgroup are unlikely to 
live for more than five additional years. The sign of the coefficient indicates that these older 
individuals are dying at an earlier age due to an increase in low-skilled labor. At this point, it is 
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important to remember that age at death serves only as a proxy for health and wellbeing. Thus, a 
decrease in age at death may not necessarily be a bad outcome for individuals who reach the age 
of 85. At these older ages, quality of life may be much more important to the individual than 
quantity of life. While age at death may be decreasing with increases in the low-skilled labor 
force share, the results for institutionalization indicate that the probability of living in an 
institution is also decreasing. Those who do not live in institutions are less likely to have medical 
interventions that are known to extend life quantity but not necessarily quality, such as feeding 
tubes, incubation, etc. Thus, seeing a younger age at death among this much older sample, due to 
changes in the labor force composition, is not necessarily an adverse outcome.  
 The breakdown by sex indicates that, contrary to the results we saw with 
institutionalization, elderly male individuals drive the main effect on age at death. Finally, 
decomposing the analysis by place of death shows large positive effects for those who die in 
nursing homes and hospitals – again, driven largely by males. Note, though, that place of death is 
only a proxy for place of residence at death, as those who die in a hospital could have previously 
been living in a nursing home or a personal home. The lack of significance when broken down 
into these subgroups, however, makes it difficult to definitively state a difference across place of 
death. First stage results for these tests for heterogeneity can be found in Appendix Table 6. 
 To check the robustness of this analysis and control for potential measurement error in 
my second stage dependent variable due to the mortality data not properly coding native-born 
and foreign-born status, I further restrict the sample to white natives 65 years old and older. The 
results are presented in Table 11. Note that both the first and the second stage are similar in sign 
and significance levels to the main results reported in Table 8, with the main second stage 
coefficient only slightly smaller in magnitude and the standard errors relatively the same when 
restricted to white individuals. This indicates that the impact of measurement error in the second 
stage dependent variable on my results is negligible. 
 
 C. Mortality Rates 
 The use of age at death as a mortality outcome is potentially biased due to the basic 
definition of the 65+ sample, which is that only those who are 65 years and older are included in 
the analysis. As a result, the effect of age at death is conditional upon an individual making it to 
the age of 65. This conditionality allows my identification strategy to be affected by the possible 
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differential sorting of individuals into the 65+ age group. For example, if low-skilled immigrants 
are influencing the long-term care markets in such a way that more marginally healthy people – 
meaning those who are on the margin of death right before and after the age of 65 – are able to 
live past their 65th birthdays, then the total composition of the 65+ age group will change. In 
particular, the average level of health and the average age at death will likely decrease. Though 
this example describes a causal effect of immigration on age at death, the effect is one for which 
my current identification strategy cannot account. It is thus possible that the inability of my 
current age at death analysis to account for this differential selection into the 65+ sample could 
be biasing my estimates in the previous section.  
To diminish the possibility of bias from differential selection into the 65+ sample, the 
final phase of my analysis follows the established health economics literature and uses mortality 
rates at the state-by-year level as the second stage dependent variable. Aggregating the 
individual-level observations, adding a denominator to the dependent variable, and age-adjusting 
the resulting mortality rates scales the dependent variable and holds the fraction of the population 
dying at each age constant over time. Since differential entrance into the 65+ age group by less 
healthy individuals would likely increase the fraction of people in the 65+ sample who die at 
younger ages, using age-adjusted mortality rates as the outcome variable of interest should down 
weight any changes in the average 65+ age group mortality due to these individuals in the 
calculation of the mortality rate. Though an improvement to the age at death outcome, this 
mortality rate may still be biased, as adding less healthy individuals into the 65+ sample will still 
change both the numerator and the denominator of the aggregate mortality rate. Even if this 
change is down weighted, the differential selection of elderly into age groups will still affect the 
mortality rate. Despite this potential bias, I run the regressions with mortality rate as the outcome 
variable in order to gain a better understanding of the elderly’s mortality outcomes.  
The main results using mortality rate as the second stage dependent variable are reported 
in Table 12. Note that this initial analysis does not restrict the sample to only the native 
population because the Cancer-SEER data does not provide population counts by immigration 
status. The first stage results are similar to those found using age at death as the dependent 
variable, which is expected given that I use the same data and years in the analysis (although the 
data are now aggregated at the state-by-year level). All of the F-statistics for the excluded 
instruments are also well above ten for the first stage regressions in Columns 1-4. The dependent 
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variable of the second stage regressions in Columns 5-8 of this table is the age-adjusted log death 
rate for the 65+ population. Beginning with only state and year fixed effects and adding state-
specific linear time trends as well as state-population-level demographic controls, the second 
stage estimates are continuously positive but statistically insignificant. The coefficient in Column 
8 suggests that a 10 percent increase in the predicted share of low-skilled labor is associated with 
a 0.527 percent increase in the mortality rate of 65+ year olds in the U.S. However, this estimate 
is not precise. To test for the potential endogenous sorting of the elderly across states, I also run 
robustness checks that exclude Florida, Arizona, and Texas from analysis. The results, presented 
in Appendix Table 2, are similar to those reported in Table 12.  
 To make my analysis of mortality rates more comparable to that of institutionalization 
and age at death, I use death counts from the Vital Statistics data as well as population counts 
from the Census/ACS data to restrict the analysis to mortality rates for the U.S. native 65+ 
population. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 13. Overall, the second stage 
estimates are slightly larger in magnitude than those reported for the total 65+ population in 
Table 12 as well as statistically significant in the first two models (Columns 5 and 6). The fixed 
effects and linear time trends model yields a coefficient of 0.219, which implies that a 10 percent 
increase in the predicted share of low-skilled labor is associated with a 2.19 percent increase in 
the mortality rate for natives 65 years old and older in the U.S. However, this coefficient loses all 
statistical significance when demographic controls are added.  
 As with my analysis of age at death, I conduct four different placebo tests on the effect of 
changes in the low-skilled labor force share on mortality rates in order to establish that my 
exclusion assumption for causal interpretation is valid. The results of these tests are reported in 
Table 14. The first panel restricts the analysis to younger age groups, while Panels 2-4 restrict to 
specific causes of death. All second stage coefficients are statistically insignificant. However, all 
of them are also relatively large in magnitude compared to the baseline estimates for the 65+ 
population. As discussed in Section B regarding the age at death analysis, the cause of death 
placebo tests are each imperfect falsification tests, as it is possible that the chosen causes are 
related to changes in the composition of the labor force. The imprecision of these estimates – as 
well as the variation in the sign of the coefficients – makes it difficult to draw any precise 
conclusions from these results.  
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 Due to the heterogeneity found with institutionalization and age at death, I test for 
heterogeneous effects on mortality rates by age and place of death. The results are presented in 
Table 15. Similar to the main effects found in Table 12, I find no statistically significant results 
in the second stage for individual subgroups. For age groups, the second stage coefficients are 
consistently positive, and the magnitudes are largest for the youngest (60-64 and 65-69) and the 
oldest (80-84 and 85+) groups. Interestingly, when broken down by place of death, it appears 
that increases in the predicted low-skilled labor force share have a negative impact on mortality 
rates for individuals who died in hospitals and “other” places but a positive impact for those who 
died in nursing homes. Note again, however, that place of death is only a proxy for place of 
residence prior to death. The results suggest that the total positive effect of predicted low-skilled 
labor that we see for the mortality rates of the entire elderly population is driven largely by those 
who die in nursing homes. However, the lack of precision makes the results only suggestive. In 
addition, for all of these mortality rate estimates, it is important to recall that any differential 
selection of individuals into the 65+ sample as the result of low-skilled immigration could also 
be causing bias. In particular, if immigrants are increasing the number of people who just barely 
cross into the 65+ age group prior to death, then it is likely that this could increase the total 
mortality rate of the entire sample.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 This study provides strong evidence that increases in the local low-skilled labor force 
share, driven by predicted low-skilled immigration, decreases an elderly individual’s probability 
of living in an institution. Using an instrumental variable strategy, I estimate increases in 
immigration that are dependent only on past migration settlement patterns and exogenous to 
current economic conditions, thus allowing my analysis to not be biased by the likely 
endogeneity of immigration flows. The main finding of approximately a 5 percent decrease in an 
individual’s probability of institutionalization due to a 10 percent increase in the predicted low-
skilled labor force share is robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends as well as 
individual-level demographic controls. A falsification test using only children – as opposed to 
the elderly – in the 2SLS analysis yields precise zeros in the second stage. This provides 
evidence that immigrants’ settlement patterns are not correlated with changes in the long-term 
care markets in different states over time except through the composition of contemporary local 
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labor markets and thus that the exclusion restriction for my instrumental strategy holds. In 
addition, robustness checks that exclude Florida, Arizona, and Texas yield similar results to the 
main regressions, indicating that any possible endogenous sorting of the elderly across states is 
not likely to be biasing my main results. The effect of low-skilled labor appears to be 
heterogeneous, with the largest impacts on the probability of institutionalization for women, 
individuals who are not married, Hispanics, those living in metropolitan areas, and those who 
report difficulties and/or disabilities. My identification strategy unfortunately does not provide 
any insight into the mechanisms driving this causal relationship, particularly whether the 
relationship is due to changes in the prices of long-term care and home production services – 
which is the mechanism proposed by Cortés and Tessada (2011) – or by endogenous 
technological growth – which is supported by Lewis (2011). Future research should investigate 
this question further by analyzing data that contains both measures of how much home health 
care and home production services elderly people are purchasing as well as information on the 
suppliers of long-term care and home production services in order to more closely evaluate 
changes in those labor and capital markets.  
 Following these results on institutionalization, the next step in my analysis investigates 
the impact of low-skilled labor force share changes on elderly mortality. Using both age at death 
and mortality rates as proxies for elderly health and wellbeing, I find less consistent evidence of 
a significant relationship. Overall, the results suggest that increases in the low-skilled labor force 
share lead to increases in an elderly individual’s age at death, with the biggest impact for males 
and younger age groups among the elderly. Concerns over the possibility of bias from the 
differential selection of marginal individuals into the 65+ sample due to low-skilled immigration 
lead me to analyze changes in aggregate mortality rates as opposed to the individual-level 
measure of age at death. This analysis suggests a positive, but imprecise, relationship between 
the low-skilled labor force share and mortality rates. While potentially less biased from 
differential sample selection than the age at death analysis due to the addition of a denominator 
for the sample and as well as the age-adjustment for the dependent variable, any selection effect 
of marginally healthy people into the sample would still cause some bias with the estimates using 
mortality rates. To more accurately estimate the total effect of low-skilled immigration on the 
mortality of elderly individuals, future research should use panel data that allows an analysis 
using the probability that an individual reaches a particular age (such as 65) as the second stage 
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dependent variable. Even if I assume that immigrants do not impact elderly selection into the 65+ 
sample, these somewhat conflicting results from age at death and mortality rates also draw 
attention to the fact that both dependent variables are only proxies for elderly health and 
wellbeing. Future research should ideally look at more intermediate measures of elderly health as 
well as individual reports of overall wellbeing in order to more precisely estimate the impact of 
labor force composition changes on elderly outcomes. 
 Given that elderly individuals on average prefer to age in their own homes, decreases in 
the probability of living in an institution due to increases in the low-skilled labor force share 
represent an actualization of elderly choice. The possibility that this actualization may also be 
affecting the mortality of elderly individuals, which is conditional on the assumption of no bias 
from differential selection into the 65+ sample, cannot be ruled out. It is possible that elderly 
individuals who are able to remain in their own homes as they age, due to the composition of 
their local labor markets, may also receive less frequent health care. If these individuals hire in-
home long-term care providers, even for eight hours a day for seven days a week, then they will 
likely be attended by a health care professional for fewer daily hours on average than individuals 
who move into skilled nursing facilities. Thus, it is possible that they could experience slower 
response times to sudden illnesses as well as lower rates of artificial life support than their 
institutionalized peers, which in turn may contribute to higher average mortality rates. However, 
physical health alone is only one component of total wellbeing. Mental health also plays an 
important role, and an individual’s mental health is likely to be better if that person is living 
where he/she would prefer to live. Thus, I cannot conclude from my analysis whether the overall 
wellbeing of elderly individuals is positively or negatively affected by labor force changes from 
low-skilled immigration. Future research will need to use more granular measures of health and 
wellbeing, as well as – ideally – longitudinal data, to answer this question. I can, however, 
definitively state that increases in the low-skilled labor force share from predicted low-skilled 
immigration decrease the rate of institutionalization for individuals who, on average, do not wish 
to be institutionalized. This result alone is important for future policy discussions regarding the 
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